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ABSTRACT
The objective of the present work is to sketch a proposal for the re-organisation
of regulatory arrangements and supervisory agencies in the European financial
markets. This proposal is formulated in light of the evolution of the role of
intermediaries and aims at speeding the ongoing process of integration of financial
markets in the Euro area. It is based on previous experiences in the matter of
financial regulation at both national and international level.
We start by reviewing objectives and theoretical models for the regulation of
financial systems. We then move to highlight some features of financial market
regulation in Italy that we consider somehow problematic as a consequence of the
recent evolution in the financial intermediaries, instruments and markets. A proposal
is then formulated for a new configuration for supervising the domestic financial
market through the assignment of different objectives or "finalities" to different
authorities. This perspective would thus entrust the three objectives of supervision --
stability, transparency and proper behaviour, competition -- to three distinct
authorities designed to oversee the entire financial market regardless of the
subjective nature of the intermediaries.
We think that our proposal could be transferred (with some benefit) to the Euro
area. This requires  to explicitly address what is probably the weakest point and the
more evident problem of the European Union construction, that of who takes care of
financial stability. In particular, one has to re-examine the issue of the need for a
lender of last resort and of the proper relationship of the European Central Bank
with other financial market regulators. We propose to establish a European System
of Financial Supervisors, with three distinct independent authorities (plus the ECB)
at the European level. They will provide incentives for and co-ordinate the work of
the three corresponding national authorities in each member country.
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2I.     INTRODUCTION
     The evolution of financial markets has been particularly significant in the last decades with
regard to intermediaries, capital markets and financial instruments.  Structural changes have mainly
involved the more traditional financial operators in banking, but have also involved investment firms
and insurance companies.
Regulatory arrangements have also been the object of significant change. Such dynamics are
at the centre of attention at international venues. A number of countries (the United States, the
United Kingdom, Australia and Japan) are in fact presently radically changing their regulatory
systems1. In other European countries, evolutionary trends are moving in the same direction.
Moreover, with the start of Phase III of the EMU, the responsibility for monetary policy in the Euro
zone has been assigned to the European Central Bank, while banking and financial supervision tasks
have been left to domestic agencies. A relevant novelty in Europe is then “the abandonment of the
coincidence between the area of jurisdiction of monetary policy and the area of jurisdiction of
banking supervision”2. The “double separation” (geographical and functional) between central
banking and banking supervision, and the absence of any explicit reference to “who takes care of
financial stability” in Europe, did cast some doubts about the efficacy of the current regulatory
arrangements in preventing and managing financial crisis and are currently at the centre of a lively
debate.
The objective of the present work is to set up a proposal for the reorganization of regulatory
arrangements and supervisory agencies in financial markets both in Italy and the European Union.
The essay opens with a section investigating objectives and theoretical models for the
regulation of the financial system3.
We then describe recent evolutionary dynamics in financial markets, intermediaries and
instruments.  We focus first on the Italian situation. Here, we highlight some “anomalies” proper to
the current regulatory system. Hence, we present a proposal for a new configuration for supervising
the domestic financial market through the assignment of different objectives or "finalities" to
different authorities.4 This perspective would thus entrust the attainment of the three objectives of
supervision on the entire financial market -- stability, transparency and investor protection,
competition -- to three distinct authorities regardless of the subjective nature of the intermediaries,
whether they be in banking, finance or insurance5. This s heme would innovate current arrangements
                                                 
1 Concerning these issues see Coffee, 1995; Dale, 1997; Taylor, 1997.
2 Padoa Schioppa, 1999.
3 See also Goodhart and Shoenmaker, 1992; Dewatripont and Tirole, 1994; Merton and Bodie, 1995; White, 1997.
4 See also Di Noia and Piatti, 1998.
5 The reference is, in the following, to life-insurance, whose behaviour is very close to the other financial
3by delegating to a sole authority the objective of transparency in banking and the suppression of
misleading advertising of  financial products.  In addition, it would highlight the objective of
competition (especially in banking) as a distinct finality explicitly monitored by the regulator.
Moreover, for the sake of consistency, the existing rules applying to other forms of financial
intermediation would be extended to include the life insurance sector.
We then extend our proposal for a regulatory reform in Italy to the Euro area. This requires
to explicitly address the problem of who takes care of financial stability in the Euro area. We re-
examine the issue of the need for a lender of last resort and of the proper relationship of the
European Central Bank with other financial market regulators. We propose to establish a European
System of Financial Supervisors, with three distinct independent authorities (plus the ECB) at the
European level.  These agencies ought to be characterized by homogeneous procedures in terms of
their creation, functioning and funding. They will push and coordinate the work of the three
corresponding national authorities in each member country.
The paper is organized as follows. In section II we describe the objectives and the
motivations for  financial markets regulation and we identify four models of regulatory structure. In
section III we deal with the regulatory framework currently in place in Italy. We first highlight what
we think are its problematic features and anomalies. We then present an hypothesis of reform based
on a fully coherent application of the supervisory model by objectives (or by finality). In section IV
we argue that such a reform could be extended to the Euro area.  Finally, we summarize our
conclusions.
II.  MODELS FOR FINANCIAL MARKET REGULATION AND SUPERVISION.
II.1 FINANCIAL MARKET REGULATION.
The theoretical underpinning for public intervention in economic matters is traditionally based
on the need to correct market imperfections and unfair distribution of the resources. Three more
general objectives of public intervention derive thereby: the pursuit of stability, equity in the
distribution of resources and the efficient use of those resources.
The regulation of the financial system can be viewed as a particularly important case of public
control over the economy. The accumulation of capital and the allocation of financial resources
constitute an essential aspect in the process of the economic development of a nation. The
peculiarities of financial intermediation and of the operators who perform this function justify the
existence of a broader system of controls with respect to other forms of economic activity. Various
                                                                                                                                                      
intermediaries.
4theoretical motivations have been advanced to support the opportunity of a particularly stringent
regulation for banks and other financial intermediaries. Such motivations are based on the existence
of particular forms of market failure in the credit and financial sectors6.
The objectives of financial market regulation.
The definition of the term 'financial market' has traditionally included the banking, financial
and insurance segments. The bounds dividing institutions, instruments and markets were clear-cut, so
that further distinctions were drawn within the different classes of intermediaries (with banks
specialized in short or medium/long term maturities, functional/commercial operations, deposits and
investments; with financial intermediaries handling broker-dealer negotiations, asset management and
advisory functions, and with insurance companies dealing in life and other insurance policies).  In this
essay, as the bounds dividing the various types of financial institutions are becoming increasingly
blurred (Corrigan, 1987), we shall refer to the financial market as an economic space wherein
operators of various kinds -- banks, financial intermediaries, mutual funds, insurance companies,
pension funds -- offer financial instruments and services.
A primary objective of financial market regulation is the pursuit of macroeconomic and
microeconomic stability. Safeguarding of the stability of the system translates into macrocontrols
over the financial exchanges, clearing houses and securities settlement systems. Measures pertaining
to the microstability of the intermediaries can be subdivided into two categories: general rules on the
stability of all business enterprises and entrepreneurial activities, such as the legally required amount
of capital, borrowing limits and integrity requirements; and more specific rules due to the special
nature of financial intermediation, such as risk based capital ratios, limits to portfolio investments and
the regulation of off-balance activities.
A second objective of financial regulation is transparency in the market and in intermediaries
and investor protection. This is linked to the more general objective of equity in the distribution of
the available resources and may be mapped into the search for "equity in the distribution of
information as a precious good" among operators.7 At the macro level, transparency rules impose
                                                 
6 White (1996) identifies certain categories of "market failure", describing them with special regard for the financial
markets: i) situations of market power brought about because of collusion, concentration, technological conditions or
public regulatory conditions; ii) economies of scale, as in the case of capital markets where an inverse relation exists
between the volume of transactions and the costs of transaction; iii) externality (spillover) effects, as in the case of a
bank failure generally affecting the confidence of savers in the entire banking system; iv) public good problems, as in
the case of the property of prices formed on the exchanges; v) information asymmetries, typically found among buyers
and sellers of financial products; vi) individuals who are unable to know their own best interest, as in the case of forms
of savings they are "unacquainted with" present in financial markets.
7 One of the classic instances of market failure is relative to the presence of information asymmetries. However, so
recent theories of financial intermediation (Allen and Santomero, 1997) seem to go beyond theories based on
5equal treatment (for example, rules regarding takeovers and public offers) and the correct
dissemination of information (insider trading, manipulation and, more generally, the rules dealing
with exchanges microstructure and price-discovery mechanisms). At the micro level, such rules aim
at non-discrimination in relationships among intermediaries and different customers (conduct of
business rules).
A third objective of financial market regulation, linked with the general objective of
efficiency, is the safeguarding and promotion of competition in the financial intermediation sector.
This requires rules for control over the structure of competition in the markets and, at the micro
level, regulations in the matter of concentrations, cartels and abuse of dominant positions.
Specific controls over financial intermediation are justified by the forms that competition can
assume in that field. They are related to the promotion of competition as well as to limiting possible
destabilizing excesses generated by competition itself.8
II.2 FINANCIAL MARKET SUPERVISORY MODELS.
There is neither a unique theoretical model nor just one practical approach to the regulation
and supervision of financial markets. Significant differences are found in the literature in terms of
both definition and classification of regulatory models and techniques.
We identify four approaches for financial market supervision and regulation: "institutional
supervision", "supervision by objectives", "functional supervision" and "single-regulator supervision".
Institutional supervision.
In the more traditional "institutional approach" (also known as "sectional" or "by subjects" or
"by markets"), supervision is performed over each single category of financial operator (or over each
single segment of the financial market) and is assigned to a distinct agency for the entire complex of
activities.  In this regulatory model, which follows the traditional segmentation of the financial
system into three markets, we thus have three supervisory authorities acting as watchdogs over,
respectively, banks, financial intermediaries and mutual funds, and insurance companies (and the
                                                                                                                                                      
information: a look at reality in fact shows that while transaction costs and asymmetric information have greatly
decreased, the activity of intermediation has considerably increased.  Financial markets seem to be more and more
markets for intermediaries than for investors or firms. The nature of all financial intermediaries (not only banks, but
also mutual funds, financial intermediaries, financial firms, pension funds) seems to be that of operators who perform
risk management activities on behalf of third parties and decrease the "costs of participation" in the financial market:
these two aspects have not yet been the object of in-depth analysis by intermediation theorists.  These same two
motivations are thought to contribute to the building of long-term relationships between intermediaries and customers
in such a way that the latter avoid ex ante research costs by simply buying the implicit insurance supplied by the
intermediaries (Allen and Gale, 1998).
8 On more than one occasion the European Commission has reaffirmed the applicability to financial markets of the
6corresponding markets). The authorities control intermediaries and markets through entry selection
processes (e.g., authorizations and enrolling procedures in special registers), constant monitoring of
the business activities (controls, inspections and sanctions) and eventual exits from the market
(suspensions or removal)9.
“Institutional” regulation facilitates the effective realization of controls, being performed with
regards to subjects that are regulated as to every aspect of their activity and as to all the objectives of
regulation. Each intermediary and market has only one supervisory authority as a counterpart. The
latter, in turn, is highly specialized.  As a result, duplication of controls is avoided and the costs of
regulation can be considerably reduced.
The institutional approach seems to be particularly effective in cases of intermediaries of a
very similar type and that do operate in just one of the three traditional segments of financial
intermediation.  Vice versa, the institutional model may give rise, in the presence of more subjects
entitled to perform the same financial intermediation activities10, to distortions in the supervisory
activity caused by the enforcement of different dispositions for operations of the same nature that are
executed by different entities. The disadvantages of this approach are represented by the previously
mentioned trend toward multiple-sector activities and by the progressive de-specialization of the
intermediaries. In turn, these phenomena are connected to the growing integration of both markets
and instruments, that frequently leads to the building of large financial conglomerates.  In a context
where the boundaries separating the various institutions are progressively being erased, it is no
longer possible to establish whether a particular subject is a bank, a non-banking intermediary or an
insurance company; or whether a group is involved more in one or another of such activities.
Therefore, there is the risk that "parallel" systems of intermediaries may be created, reflecting the
diversity of the respective control authorities. In this case, the way the controls are set up may
become a destabilizing rather than stabilizing factor. Moreover, the intermediaries might be induced
to choose their juridical status in a way which is contingent on the different rules that discipline
different subjects.
A further possible element of weakness in the model lies in the fact that when a single
authority supervises a category of subjects and pursues more than one objective, the result of the
control activity might not be effective in the event that different objectives are in conflict11.
                                                                                                                                                      
general regulation on competition. The Court of Justice has also upheld such orientation.
9 As an example of the institutional approach, one can consider the regulatory system provided for the insurance
market and intermediaries in Italy by the Isvap (See below - Section III).
10 Consider the negotiating activity in the stock exchange performed by both banks and financial intermediaries, or
else the gathering of savings realized by life insurance companies, similar to that undertaken by mutual funds.
11 The classic example is the trade-off between the objective of stability and that of competition (See below - Section
7Supervision by objectives.
The supervisory model by objectives (or by finalities) postulates that all intermediaries and
markets be subjected to the control of more than one authority, each single authority being
responsible for one objective of regulation regardless of both the legal form of the intermediaries and
of the functions or activities they perform. According to this scheme, an authority is to watch over
both market stability and the solvency of each intermediary, whether in banking, finance or insurance;
another authority will be responsible for the transparency of financial markets and will control the
behavior of banks, financial intermediaries and insurance companies toward customers; a third
authority will guarantee and safeguard competition over the entire financial market and among
intermediaries12.
The basic advantage of this regulatory model lies in the fact that it is particularly effective in a
highly-integrated market context and in the presence of polifunctional operators, conglomerates and
groups operating in a variety of different business sectors. At the same time, it does not require an
excessive proliferation of control units.
The most attractive feature of this scheme is that it provides uniform regulation for the
different subjects engaged in the same activities.
Compared to the "institutional" model, a regulatory framework organized by objectives may
produce a certain degree of multiplication of the controls. And sometimes it could lead to a lack of
certain controls.  Indeed, the specific assignment of competencies with respect to the objectives of
regulation is not necessarily univocal and all-inclusive in practice. In such a model, each intermediary
is subject to the control of more than one authority, and this may be more costly. The intermediaries
might in fact be required to produce several reports relating to supervision, often containing identical
or similar information.  At the same time, the intermediaries may have to justify the same action to a
whole set of authorities contemporaneously, even though for different reasons.  Vice versa, a deficit
of controls might occur whenever the exact areas of responsibility are not clearly identifiable in
specific cases.
Functional  Supervision.
The third regulatory model is the so-called "functional supervision”, or supervision “by
                                                                                                                                                      
III).
12 In the Italian system, the supervisory model by objectives has found application, at least nominally, in the Finance
Law “Testo Unico delle disposizioni in materia di intermediazione finanziaria” (DL 58/1998) where it is established,
with reference to intermediaries, that the competent authority in the matter of risk containment and financial stability
is the Banca d'Italia, while the Consob is responsible for transparency and proper behavior.
8activity".  It considers as "given" the economic functions performed in the financial system; unlike
other lines of thought regarding supervisory activities, this approach does not postulate that existing
institutions, whether operative13 or r gulatory14 , must necessarily continue to exist as such, in terms
of both their structure and role.  The "functions" or activities undertaken are considered to be more
stable than the institutions that perform them. Competition among financial systems is thought to
drive existing institutions to evolve in a dynamic perspective in the direction of new and more
efficient forms.
According to Merton and Bodie (1995), the financial system is considered to perform six
basic functions:
- to provide ways of clearing and settling payments in order to facilitate trade;
- to provide a mechanism for the pooling of resources and for portfolio diversification;
- to provide ways of transferring economic resources through time, across borders, and among
industries;
- to provide ways of managing risks;
- to provide price information to help coordinate decentralized decision making in the various sectors
of the economy;
- to provide ways of dealing with the incentive problems created when one party in a transaction has
information that the other party does not have or when one party acts as agent for another.
In the functional supervisory model, each type of such financial services should be regulated
by a given authority independently of the operator who offers it. Hence, also this approach has the
important advantage that it calls for the same rules to be applied to intermediaries who perform the
same activity of financial intermediation even though such operators may fall into different categories
from a legal standpoint.  For example, activities including investment management, the gathering of
deposits, lending, and savings invested in insurance/retirement funds are each subject to
homogeneous rules established by individual authorities, which independently supervise such
activities regardless of the institutions engaged. This approach fosters economies of specialization
within the supervisory authorities and might represent a rather attractive solution for the regulation
of integrated, advanced financial markets. However, it is not without drawbacks. This model
envisions an overlapping of bodies controlling the same subject: there is the risk of an excessive
division of competencies among the regulatory agencies.15
                                                 
13 Banks, mutual funds, intermediation firms, insurance companies and other financial intermediaries.
14 Bodies for controlling stability, supervisory organs to guarantee transparency, antitrust authorities and other
supervisory agencies.
15 Oldfield and Santomero (1997) view financial institutions as a set including banks, insurance companies,
investment companies (open and closed funds, other forms of collective investment, pension funds), origination firms
9A further disadvantage of the functional approach is that finally what is subject to failure is
not the activity performed, but the institution.  In case of serious problems of stability, it would be
essential to guarantee protection and oversight with regard to the institutions rather than to
individual operations (Padoa-Schioppa, 1988).
"Single-regulator supervision”.
The single-regulator supervisory model is based on just one control authority, separated from
the central bank, and with responsibility over all markets and intermediaries regardless of whether in
the banking, financial or insurance sector. This authority would be concerned with all the objectives
of regulation (stability, transparency and investor protection, maybe competition).
In the regulatory practice, the centralized supervisory model has typically characterized early
stages of financial system development, often in periods when the central bank was the only
institution that supervised the activity of financial intermediaries. Faced in recent times with the
globalization and integration of the markets, the English brought this model back into being with the
creation of the Financial Services Authority - FSA (See Briault, 1999).16  The British executive's
decision to merge the preexistent supervisory authorities – part of the Central Bank staff, the
Securities Investment Board, the directorship of the Department of Trade and Industry competent in
the insurance field and the Security Regulatory Organizations (SROs) -- in the FSA is based on the
search for a more efficient organization of regulatory activities including a reduction in the costs of
regulation itself. Also, it was considered useful to have just one agency accountable to the Parliament
and to the market17.
The advantages of this approach lie in the economies of scale that it produces. Fixed costs
and logistical expenses, the costs of administrative personnel and the compensation for the top
management are all considerably reduced. Moreover, this scheme calls for a unified view which is
particularly useful and effective with respect to polifunctional groups and conglomerates.  By the
                                                                                                                                                      
(investment firms, credit institutions, insurance brokers and financial promoters), market-makers (specialists, dealers
and reinsurance companies), stock exchanges (cash and derivatives), clearing houses and other financial operators.
The services provided by these financial institutions can be classified in six different activities: origination
(identification, evaluation and creation of financial activities originating with the customers of an institution),
distribution (the collection of funds through the sale of new financial products), servicing (the management of
payments flow from financial activities issuers to holders), packaging (pooling and tailoring of financial activities to
fit the specific needs of customers through greater personalization of goods and services offered), intermediating
(setting up of financial activities and contemporaneous buy-back of different financial activities on the part of the same
intermediary), market making (purchase or sale of financial activities).  In a regulatory perspective this taxonomy
might lead to an arrangement wherein every activity would correspond to a different supervisory activity.
16 The single-regulator model was first developed in Scandinavia (Denmark, Norway and Sweden) more than a decade
ago. See Taylor and Fleming (1999).
17 The costs of the FSA are funded directly by the market through a system of contributions and taxes charged to the
supervised institutions.
10
same token, the costs of supervision charged to the subjects regulated and/or to the taxpayer
decrease.
However, the validity of this model depends to a high degree on its internal organization: if
the numerous areas of competence and specialization are not well-structured and coordinated, the
risk is to slow the decision-making process.  As underlined by Wilson (1989), what counts is a clear
definition of the agency's "mission".  Also, the presence of a sole regulator might render collusive
relations more immediate and direct (“regulatory capture”). Finally, it might exacerbate problems of
self-contradiction in the event that the authority should find itself forced to pursue conflicting
supervisory objectives.  This sort of problem might in part be overcome thanks to an internal
organization divided "by objectives", but the fact that there is only one top management would end
up in the prevalence of a single objective as final consequence of the decision-making process.
II.3  IS THERE AN OPTIMAL MODEL FOR SUPERVISION?
Our presentation of the main regulatory models of the financial system should have made
clear how hard it is to establish which alternative offers a decisively superior arrangement.  In real
life we find a prevalence of "mixed" approaches which borrow in heterogeneous fashion elements
that are proper to more than just one model.
The institutional model could be considered a good candidate only in a context with rigidly
separated financial segments, and where no global players are at stake. Nowadays, we think that this
picture does not apply to the major advanced countries, where we do observe high integration in
financial markets and intermediaries and a strong presence of polifunctional groups and
conglomerates.
The most evident problems with regard to the functional supervisory model are the following:
i) it might call for too many regulators, corresponding to the numerous functions and activities that
the intermediaries perform; ii) it does not explicitly address questions regarding the stability (possible
failures) of the single institutions.
Hence, we think that modern financial systems should rely on either a single regulator or
independent agencies, each one responsible for one of the three objectives of regulation.
However, we are particularly concerned with the possible conflict of interest in pursuing
different objectives when these are assigned to the same agency. Clearly, the "single-regulator"
model is truly affected by the possible incompatibility among the supervisory objectives.18 In the
credit sector, for instance, we find a clear trade-off between competition and stability (at least in the
                                                 
18 Moreover, the single- regulator model could also lead to excessive concentration of regulatory powers.
11
short run). The need to safeguard stability led, particularly in moments of economic and financial
tension, to the use of instruments designed to limit competition, such as institutional barriers to entry
in the market, or to the legal imposition of limits to operative activities. In financial systems where
banks are prevalent but not efficient enough to compete cross-border, the objective of competition is
usually sacrificed more easily than that of macroeconomic stability.  The consequence is a “stable”
environment in terms of the number and identity of the intermediaries. But this is obtained by altering
the free play of competition through measures that prevent exit of inefficient actors from the market.
Another case is that of the possible conflict between the objectives of stability and
transparency.  Again with regard to the banking sector, scarce transparency in fund gathering
activities (e.g., in the issue of securities) might allow the application of interest rates below market
rates.  Such behavior could be considered functional to the strengthening of the stability of banks,
but it would result in direct injury to investors.
The most immediate response to this important problem might be to attribute to different
authorities different objectives of supervision, that is to adopt the regulatory model by objectives as
the benchmark for advanced financial systems. This solution could be designed so as to avoid an
excessive proliferation of authorities and thus limit the increase in both direct and indirect costs of
regulation19 . In what follows, we will present a proposal of reform of the regulatory framework
currently in place in Italy which is inspired by this model. We will also argue that such model could
be usefully adopted at the Euro level.
III.  REGULATORY ARRANGEMENTS IN THE ITALIAN FINANCIAL SYSTEM
III.1  INTEGRATION AMONG INTERMEDIARIES, MARKETS AND INSTRUMENTS
As already mentioned, banking, securities and insurance segments are becoming increasingly
integrated in terms of markets, intermediaries and financial instruments. The boundaries separating
banking, securities and insurance activities are in fact on their way out in most developed financial
systems because of the strong process of technological, geographical and functional integration
among these three sectors; and as a consequence of the de-specialization of the intermediaries. The
"reserved activities" that characterized financial operators by type are constantly decreasing at both
the normative and operative level.  As a matter of fact the traditional tripartite division of the
financial market failed to take into consideration that the creation and allocation of savings among
                                                 
19 The literature available to date on both fronts is not vast. An important contribution is Goodhart (1988). Attention is
also called to a recent empirical work by Franks, Schaefer and Staunton (1997) on the direct and indirect costs of the
regulation of financial markets, which among other things evidences the absence of research on the benefits of
regulation.
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sectors with a cash surplus and sectors with a cash deficit were basically unitary phenomena: hence,
a unitary view of financial intermediation and its regulation should be adopted.
In the case of Italy, the processes of integration within the financial market have come about
in a rather articulated fashion.
As regards the intermediaries, ownership integration has been accentuated, coming about
mainly through the transfer of capital shares among institutions, or among controlling and controlled
firms20 . Another form of integration among intermediaries may be detected in the transformation of
their legal status, even when continuing to perform basically the same intermediation activities as
before. This occurred in particular with investment firms (SIM - società di intermediazione mobiliare)
which have been legally transformed into banks, even though they have not as their primary objective
the issue of deposits or the provision of loans.  The reasons for this "arbitrage" among legally diverse
forms are multiple: access to credit of last resort and to the interbank liquidity market; possibility of
directly managing customers’ liquidity; concerns about a sounder image ("too bank to fail"); differing
modalities for crisis management; different regulatory costs;  different supervisory authorities to have
to deal with.
As regards the markets, considerable integration has taken place between the
banking/insurance markets and the securities markets. This occurred by virtue of the issue and
quotation on either the Stock Exchange or other markets of securities (equities and bonds) of both
banks and insurance companies. The Italian financial market is thus experiencing a progressive
coincidence between issuers and financial intermediaries.21 This feature is likely to develop even
further. These intermediaries have in fact become, with the "privatization" process of the Stock
Exchange and of the MTS (the Wholesale Government Bonds Market), owners and managers in the
same regulated financial markets, which have been transformed into corporations. Recently, some
banks have also started to manage directly alternative trading systems (as the TLX, by Unicredito
Italiano).
As regards the integration among financial instruments, we observe that many of these, while
keeping their legal status, have rapidly changed their economic function. This is due to both
exogenous factors -- such as fiscal considerations, or different regulations applied to similar financial
tools – and to endogenous factors -- such as the different behavior of sellers and buyers (here we
refer in particular to certificates of deposit and bonds issued by banks, and to certain types of life
                                                 
20 For a detailed and analytical description of the issues in Subsections III1 e III2, see Di Noia e Piatti (1998).
21 This phenomenon seems to be peculiar to Italy. Data on stock exchange capitalization indicate that the weight of the
financial sectors in the Italian stock market is much higher in 1998 (42.4% of market capitalization) than in other
advanced countries (18.2% in the US, 26.4% in France, 33.7% in Germany, 26.9% in the UK, 18.2% in Japan). See
IRS, Rapporto sul Mercato Azionario 1999.
13
insurance policies).
The role of insurance companies as financial intermediaries is also constantly increasingly,
thanks to contracts involving life insurance and capitalization, whose services are directly tied to
investment funds or to stock exchange or other financial indices (so-called unit-linked or index-
linked contracts).22 Nowadays, the inclusion of the life insurance segment among those activities
subject to financial regulation is something accepted in the major financial systems. Over the last few
years, market changes have actually lessened the distinctiveness of some schemes of life insurance
compared to other financial products. In the English system, for instance, long-term life insurance
contracts are included in the notion of investment (financial instruments) as provided by the Financial
Services Act of 1986. This law and its implementing rules regulate the selling of long-term business
(life and pensions, see also Boléat, 1998). Insurance companies have the same treatment of unit
trusts in terms of their selling activity. The recent establishment of the FSA will further reduce the
distinctiveness of insurance companies by applying a common regulation to all financial institutions.
In the U.S. system, variable annuities and variable life insurance contracts whose yield is tied to
“separate accounts”23 fall under the Investment Company Act of 1940, which provides the general
guidelines relative to investment activities, reinvestment, and the buying and selling of financial
securities. Besides, as contract owners assume certain investment risks under variable contracts, the
contracts are securities under the Securities Act of 1933. In Italy, on the contrary, insurance
companies are excluded from the set of rules that apply to banks and to other financial
intermediaries. The exemption  from such rules derives from the fact that life insurance policies are
not considered financial instruments (see Article 1 of the Finance Law) and that insurance companies
are not authorised to perform investment services. Although there is an increasing tendency to
recognise the high degree of contiguity between certain insurance products and typical financial
products, the regulatory differences in the Italian system remain significant. Italian insurance
companies are supervised and controlled by only one supervisory authority, the Isvap (Istituto di
Vigilanza sulle Assicurazioni Private).
III.2  THE REGULATORY MODEL.
Financial markets regulation in Italy has been obviously affected by the structure and the
evolution of the financial system. It was traditionally focused on banking intermediaries. The major
                                                 
22 Whenever an insurance company offers these kinds of financial products, it unquestionably falls into the category of
subjects engaged in the activity of financial intermediation, as it is linking economic sectors in surplus with those in
deficit.
23 In such contracts, the value of what the owner may receive during the pay-in (and sometimes the pay-out) period
depends upon the investment performance of the separate account into which his or her payments have been invested.
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changes in the past three decades have come about under the pressure of both the European
directives and of increasing cross-border financial market integration. Such changes have been
grafted onto a regulatory system whose basic approach was to carve a three-way division of the
financial market into banking, securities and insurance sectors.  This division was reflected in a three-
way division of the intermediaries and a corresponding division of the regulatory authorities: Banca
d'Italia, Consob (Commissione Nazionale per le Società e la Borsa) and Isvap.  New regulations were
frequently introduced and in a rather uncoordinated fashion. The final outcome is a structure of
controls which is difficult to classify into any one of the theoretical models previously illustrated. The
distribution of competencies among the different supervisory authorities is in fact characterized by a
"mixed" approach (See Table 1).
As for insurance companies, the institutional model is followed (with Isvap supervising them
for stability and transparency).  The institutional model is partly used also for banks. They are
supervised by Banca d'Italia for stability and transparency in all typical banking activities (deposits
and loans), as well as for those aspects regarding competition (Law 287/1990 excludes the Antitrust
Authority from having primary control over banks).
Then, there is the case of pension funds where a mixed institutional-functional approach is
used. Here an activity, the payout of private pensions, is reserved to well-specified financial
intermediaries while at the same time being an exclusive object coming under the control of Covip
(Commissione di Vigilanza sui Fondi Pensione). Nevertheless, the Ministry of Labor issues general
directives in the matter of the supervision of pension funds (with the Ministry of the Treasury), and
supervises the Covip.  The Ministry of Labour does also authorize the exercise of this activity, while
the Ministry of the Treasury, after hearing the Commission's opinion, issues regulations setting limits
and criteria in the matter of investments, and the rules to be observed in the case of conflicts of
interest.
The model by objectives formally characterizes the regulation of entities officially authorized
to perform investment services, with regard to such activities: banks, investment firms, investment
management firms, mutual funds and Sicav (Società di Investimento a Capitale Variabile).  These
intermediaries are supervised by Consob insofar as transparency and investor protection and by
Banca d'Italia insofar as "limitation of risk and financial stability" (Article 5, Paragraphs 2-3, Finance
Law).  Moreover, the Antitrust Authority has exclusive competence for the rules on competition for
all authorized subjects with the exception of banks.
A supervisory model by objectives seems to emerge with respect to the entire securities
market, and not just to the intermediaries. The recent evolution of the normative framework assigns
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to the Consob all the powers in the field of transparency in the market (secondary regulation of the
solicitation of public saving, of insider trading, of takeovers and public offers, etc.).  Similarly, Banca
d'Italia might be considered responsible in the matter of stability (regulation -- not necessarily
exclusive -- of compensation, liquidation, clearing houses, wholesale securities markets, central
depository, settlement systems, etc.).  The Antitrust Authority might be considered responsible for
guaranteeing competition among different exchanges.
Table 1: Competent Authorities for the Supervision of Financial Intermediaries in Italy.
Intermediaries ß Objective  Þ Stability Transparency and
Proper behaviour
Competition
Banks BankItalia,
Cicr,
Min.Tesoro
BankItalia,
Cicr,
Consob,
Min.Tesoro
(Antitrust)
BankItalia
(Antitrust)
Investment
Firms
BankItalia,
Min.Tesoro
Consob,
(Antitrust)
Antitrust
Life Insurance Isvap,
Cipe,
Min. Industria
Isvap,
(Antitrust),
Cipe
Antitrust,
(Isvap),
Cipe
Investment
Funds
BankItalia,
Min. Tesoro
Consob,
(Antitrust)
Antitrust
Pension Funds Commissione
Fondi Pensione,
Min.Lavoro,
Min.Tesoro
Commissione Fondi
Pensione,
Min.Tesoro
(Antitrust)
Antitrust
III.3  CURRENT REGULATORY PROBLEMS.
Our previous description of the regulatory framework adopted in the Italian financial system
should have already indicated the presence of some rather peculiar features. In this paragraph we
want to underline those peculiarities that we view as regulatory problems.
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Many of these problems derive from the dominant role traditionally performed by banks in
the Italian financial system, and hence from their regulator, the central bank.  A premise is
necessary: for a long time the Bank of Italy has been representing a relevant and positive exception
in the Italian public administration sector. However, a logically incoherent assignment to the same
institution of mutually conflicting tasks might still be dangerous and lead to an inefficient functioning
of the financial system. This is true with regard to the regulatory objectives as well as to the policy
instruments that can be activated in order to reach the former.
A first problem is that of having banking supervision conducted in a regime of monopoly by
the central bank24.  This feature is unique among G-7 countries. Even though we will not discuss it
here, we want to underline that the problem has only partially been solved with the start of the EMU
and the assignment to the ECB of full responsibility for monetary policy in the Euro area.  As a
matter of fact the national central-bank governors participate to formulate the monetary policy
strategies and decisions and are responsible for their implementation in the domestic economy.
Hence, so far there is no complete separation of tasks.
A striking anomaly, which is unique in the Euro area, is represented by the assignment to the
Bank of Italy of the task of preserving competition in the banking sector. We do not think that there
is any motivation nowadays to give such a responsibility to an Institution different from the one (the
Antitrust Authority) that supervises this feature in all other economic sectors.  The rationale of this
regulation is to be found in the fact that the Antitrust Authority was established only recently in Italy
(1990). In absence of such an Institution, the possibility that dominant coalitions and excessive
market power could arise in the banking sector was considered too dangerous and justified the
assignment of the task of preserving competition in the market to the already existing Institution
controlling the banking system for prudential supervision.  Today, however, no reason remains to
assign the same objective of regulation to different Institutions in different sectors.
Moreover, it is logically incoherent to assign responsibility for competition in one sector to
the same Institution that is responsible for the stability of the same sector. As already stressed, at
least in the short run, an obvious conflict emerges between the two objectives of stability and
competition. And, as a matter of fact, in many of the M&A operations in the Italian banking sector,
the opinions of the Antitrust Authority (which are not compelling) and those of the Bank of Italy
have been opposite (Cafagna and Sciolli, 1996).  A competitive market is by nature unsteady, in the
sense that allows for the entry of new firms and the exit of the inefficient ones. In recent periods
there were examples of this peculiar role of the Bank which stopped some takeovers of some banks
                                                 
24 See Di Noia and Di Giorgio (1999) for an updated discussion of the pros and cons of separating monetary policy
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over other banks because they were hostile. Beside, the Bank stated that it is necessary for the Bank
to know in advance any intention to launch a takeover: but in the event of listed banks, reasons of
investor protection would make necessary that any price-sensitive news should be disclosed to the
market, or at least to the market authority.
The Authority which is responsible for the stability of the system could indeed have a
regulatory bias for the protection of firms that should be left to exit the market. The usual
motivation of the risk of contagion and of investors protection would be advocated.  However, we
think that the risk of contagion is not necessarily and inevitably linked to all single bank crisis.
Moreover, this risk could be countered with other instruments, including more transparency and
information diffusion in the market.
We also think that there is no clear argument to protect the interest of investors other than
bank depositors. Why should the bond and equity holders of a bank be more protected than those of
a non financial firm? In addition, we should also notice that the “small and naive” depositors are
already protected by an explicit deposit insurance system.
Another anomaly in the Italian financial system is that the Bank of Italy owns relevant shares
and equities of either banks or other financial institutions controlling banks. The Bank of Italy
invests in equities both part of its ordinary reserves and part of the contributions of the employees’
pension fund.25 Quite obviously, monetary policy decisions in terms of interest rates (previous to the
start of the EMU) and the supervisory and regulatory decisions have such a relevant effect on the
profitability conditions of the supervised entities that the Central Bank should be not allowed to be a
shareholder of the same entities. At least, its equity investments should be decided and managed by
one or more totally independent and autonomous financial manager.
Another problem stems from the different regulation given to life insurance firms, particularly
when they act purely as financial intermediaries.  The life insurance industry, throughout contracts
such as unit and index-linked schemes, has been gradually losing its distinctiveness. We think it
should no longer be regulated as a different function from banking and financial investment, nor
having its own regulator. A step in this direction may be represented by a recent decree approved by
the Italian Parliament (February 2000) on the fiscal treatments of pension funds, which establishes
equivalent fiscal regimes for mutual funds and unit and index-linked short term contracts.
                                                                                                                                                      
responsibilities from the ones for banking supervision and regulation. See also Goodhart and Shoenmaker (1992).
25 Some data: by the end of 1999, the Bank of Italy owned shares higher than 2% of the company capital in 10 listed
firms, including a bank (Italfondiario, 8%), a financial holding company (IFI) and many insurance companies
(Alleanza, Generali, INA, La Fondiaria), that in turn were either involved in the control of, or controlled by, other
Italian banks, whose supervisor is Bank of Italy itself.
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III.4 PROSPECTS FOR REGULATORY REFORM OF THE ITALIAN FINANCIAL
SYSTEM
      In this subsection, we shall present the basic lines of our operative proposal for a regulatory
reform of the Italian financial system. With the Finance Law, Italian legislators have already begun to
reorder competencies among the various supervisory authorities. We think that it would be wise to
go further. Regulatory arrangements in the Italian financial system should be organized according to
a clear division of competencies strictly in line with the “by objective” model. The object of such a
regulatory change should be the entire securities, banking and life insurance market.26
The authority responsible for (micro) stability should supervise the stability of the entire
financial market and of single financial intermediaries whether in banking, securities or insurance
(authorizations; professional registers; supervision in the area of information, regulations and
inspections of intermediaries and conglomerates; other matters regarding stability; crises
management). We think that this authority should also manage deposit insurance and the investor
compensation scheme. In fact, the current agencies (the FITD- Fondo interbancario di Tutela dei
Depositi, and the Fondo Nazionale di Garanzia) have no regulatory and supervisory powers at all.
These agencies simply act as the cash management department of other regulating institutions when
reimboursing depositors and investors. There are clearly cost reductions that could be achieved by
their elimination. As regards macroeconomic stability, this authority should only cooperate with the
central bank in supervising security settlement and payment systems and clearing houses; but it could
be charged with supervision over financial instruments in wholesale markets, with particular regard
to government bonds and derivatives.
The authority responsible for transparency and investor protection should supervise
disclosure requirements and the proper behavior of intermediaries and the orderly conduct of trading
in all financial intermediation activities performed by banking, securities, and life insurance
intermediaries (including discipline and control in the area of transparency in contracts). Moreover,
this authority would be assigned powers in the area of misleading advertising by financial
intermediaries. Finally, it should control macro-transparency in financial markets (including the
discipline of insider trading, takeovers and public offers).
The authority for competition should guarantee fair competition, and should avoid abuses of
dominant position and limit dangerous concentrations in banking, security and insurance sectors.  A
                                                 
26 In terms of international application, a regulatory structure embracing the whole financial market including the
insurance market is to be found both in the previously-cited English and Scandinavian reforms and in the reform of
the Australian system. The Australian reform establishes a clear division of competencies by objectives, excluding, as
in the United Kingdom, the central bank from microstability controls over intermediaries.
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non-binding opinion of the authority for stability might be contemplated in certain instances.
As we have previously mentioned, the major problem of supervision by objectives is the
possible duplication of supervisory activities. The necessary coordination and resolution of eventual
controversies could be provided by a Commission for the Supervision of the Financial System (as in
the Corrigan Report - Corrigan 1987) which would assist the Ministry of the Treasury, which in turn
should be charged with oversight in the area of fund gathering, credit practices and other financial
activities. The commission would be the natural place for activities involving proposals and
consultation concerning measures regarding financial market regulation.
In practice, we propose the following major reforms for the Italian financial regulatory
framework:
1) To create a new Institution (Financial Supervision Authority) responsible for financial
supervision by separating the Banking Supervision Department of the Bank of Italy
(Vigilanza) and merging it with the deposit insurance fund (FITD).
2) To assign to the Financial Supervision Authority responsibilities in terms of
microeconomic stability of all financial intermediaries, including banks, investment firms,
institutional investors, life insurance companies and pension funds. Macroeconomic
stability and controls over security settlement and payment systems should be left under
the responsibility of the Bank of Italy.
3) To subtract any responsibility in terms of competition in the banking and insurance
sectors to either the Bank of Italy or the ISVAP and assign them only to the Antitrust
Authority.
4) To assign to the CONSOB all powers and responsibilities in terms of transparency,
disclosure requirements, investor protection and misleading advertising in all financial
markets.
5) Covip should be abolished; ISVAP would be responsible only for the activities of the
insurance companies which are not alike those of other financial intermediaries (ramo
danni).
Our three distinct independent authorities ought to be characterized by homogeneous
procedures in terms of their creation, functioning and funding, as well as by similar attributions of
powers.27  A sketch of our proposal based on a “four-peak” model of financial regulation follows
(Figure 1).
                                                 
27 See Di Noia and Piatti (1998).
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Figure 1.  A 4-Peak Model for Financial Regulation
 ECB-BankItalia  Authority for SupervisionAuthority for Transparency   Antitrust
(macrostability
and monetary
policy)                Banks             Investment Firms and Funds     Life Insurance
IV.  FINANCIAL STABILITY AND REGULATION IN EUROPE.
In the recently established Euro-area, and given the increasing integration among European
financial markets, it could seem quite useless to present proposals of institutional reforms for
financial market regulation that are limited to single countries. In this section, we will argue that a
natural extension to the financial system at the Euro level of the regulatory model by objectives could
be considered a good candidate to solve some problematic issues regarding financial stability and the
need for more coordinated transparency and investor protection rules. These topics are currently at
the centre of a lively debate (see Padoa Schioppa, 1999; Lannoo, 1999; Vives, 1999).
We start by observing that in the European Monetary Union (EMU), the principle of
separating monetary policy and banking supervision responsibilities has been clearly established in
the statute of the European Central Bank (ECB). The latter empowers the ECB to set out and
conduct monetary policy in the Euro area, but leaves the responsibility for banking supervision to the
national authorities. It could be argued that a problem of institutional separation between monetary
policy and banking supervision agencies does not exist any longer in the Euro area28 , ev n th ugh in
countries where the national central bank (NCB) is a monopolist in banking supervision, the
separation is not complete as the NCB Governor does also participate to the definition of the general
strategies of European monetary policy which are set out in the ECB Governing Council.
However, as argued above, the term banking supervision should be replaced by that of
financial supervision. The stability of the financial system could not be so much at risk because of the
loan/deposit activities performed by banks. Instead, financial instability could be induced by activities
linked to portfolio management, which are typical of investment banks and securities firms.29
                                                 
28 In fact, ''even in countries where the competent authority for banking supervision is the central bank, by definition
this authority is, functionally speaking, no longer a central bank, as it lacks the key central banking task of
autonomously controlling money creation'' (Padoa Schioppa, 1999).
29 A well known recent example of a serious threat to financial stability is the LTCM case. Here, a non bank
institution was rescued thanks to the moral suasion of the FED, that is not responsible for the supervision of hedge
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The real problem to tackle should then be that of who takes care of financial regulation and
supervision in the EMU. At the moment there is no clear assignment of roles and responsibilities
agreed upon at EU level. However, we think that there is no point in having a common monetary
policy and aiming at an always more integrated financial system in the Euro area while keeping
different financial regulations and supervising rules in each member country. As a matter of fact,
these institutional differences are an important barrier to further financial integration.  In this field,
the principle of minimum harmonization and mutual recognition, that was originally thought to be
able to naturally induce over time a convergence of regulatory behaviour and more uniform rules,
clearly did not work.  Moreover, there is a concrete risk that competition in this area will not even
generate the more efficient outcome: on one side there exists an obvious incentive to promote less
demanding domestic financial regulations and supervision in order to let the own country become
more attractive for running financial business; while on the other side it is not clear who will pay the
costs of potential insolvency following excessive risk taking behavior and financial misconduct in a
member country (see below). Finally, with increasing international banking activities and a European
real time gross settlement system in place (Target), the argument that domestic regulators and
supervisors have better knowledge and can exercise more efficient control becomes day by day less
effective (See Prati and Schinasi, 1999).
Another importan point is that no clear tool nor any responsibility to counter and/or manage
the risk of financial instability and crisis has been established in Europe.  The Treaty is silent on this
topic. It is not even evident that the role of lender of last resort will be performed by the ECB, as it
would be desirable being an essential function of a central bank. In fact, this solution will probably
occur only in the case of a widely spread liquidity crisis affecting the whole Euro area.  But what will
follow a liquidity crisis located in a single country?  And what a solvency crisis?
Suppose we face a situation in which a single financial institution located in a member
country is in trouble. What kind of intervention, if any, is currently allowed?  One of the typical
forms of public intervention seems lost, and probably the most natural, that of central bank last resort
loans.  The ECB will not intervene in favour of a single institution, especially if its financial links are
mostly domestic. Also because it could always assign some of the responsibility for the crisis to the
domestic financial regulator-supervisor. The domestic central bank can not intervene by providing
funds without an explicit authorization by the ECB. In this case, it will have to convince the latter
that the institution is facing a liquidity and not a solvency crisis, according to the Bagehot's doctrine
                                                                                                                                                      
funds.
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(1873),  and / or that the risk of potential spread and contagion of the crisis is high.30 This requires
time and resources. The other two traditional instruments, bail out through a safety net provided by
the banking system or through the government budget will ultimately shift the burden on the
shoulders of domestic taxpayers, especially in the framework established in the Stability and Growth
Pact. Given the current level of taxes in Europe, this is hardly an optimal solution.
We think that a much higher degree of co-ordination in the field of financial regulation d
prudential supervision is both desirable and needed in the EMU. Our view is not limited to the
banking system but embraces all financial intermediaries. A somehow good example of international
cooperation can already be found in the banking supervision, with the Basle Committee working on a
wide range of topics with no formal by-laws, but a very strong leadership. On the contrary, the
securities supervision has not succeeded in establishing a similar long record of international rule-
making. In a world of complete mobility of capital and financial services, where institutions and
markets operate without frontiers, supervision should operate at the same level, that is to say, it must
be structured internationally31 . Moreover, following the view we adopted on the national base, we
think that the European supervisory system would gain both in consistency and effectiveness if all
stability oriented rules, all transparency oriented rules and all competition oriented rules for all types
of financial institutions were either issued or (may be better) coordinated by distinct independent
agencies at the Euro area.
Of course, we are aware that it is not easy to structure and create such an integrated system
of rules and institutions in the EU, that it will require time, resources and a widespread collaborative
attitude. Hence, we list not one but three possible paths of institutional changes that can reintroduce
the function of lending of last resort in the Euro zone and at the same time allow for a sounder
scenario in case of a financial crisis.  The last solution is the one we prefer, inspired by the same logic
we used for our proposal of reform of the Italian financial system. However, we view also the other
two following ways as better solutions with respect to the current situation.
1) A first possibility is to assign supervisory powers and responsibilites in the banking sector
to the ECB. However, even leaving aside the arguments against the solution of merging banking
supervision and monetary policy, this arrangement would still be not satisfactory and would require
other institutional changes, as it would be certainly desirable to have a common supervisor for all
financial intermediaries. The Maastricht Treaty would then have to be amended, as it explicitly
                                                 
30 See Freixas et al. (1999), Bruni and de Boisseu (1999), and De Cecco (1999).
31 This does not necessarily lead to the creation of a European SEC (see Lannoo 1999a, Karmel 1999), even though
such hypothesis could become realistic in the medium run.
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forbids that supervisory powers regarding insurance firms be assigned to the ECB.
2) A new European System of Financial Regulation (ESFR), structured similarly to the
ESCB, could be established. A European Financial Regulation Authority (EFRA) should be at the
centre of the system. The EFRA should be formally separated by the ECB, both in order to avoid
excessive concentration of powers as well as for other arguments.32
In a first stage (3 years?), the EFRA would harmonize and coordinate financial regulation in member
countries, design common principles and guidelines for prudential supervision and set out
appropriate disclosure instruments and requirements. This central agency should sponsor the
necessary institutional change at domestic level leading to merging and re-organization of
supervisory and regulatory powers in the financial sector of each member country. At the end of the
process, in each country there will be just one national agency, similar in structure to the Financial
Service Authority recently established in the UK. This national agency will participate to the
definition of the general strategies and principles of financial regulation in the area, becoming a
member of the ESFR. It will be responsible for the implementation in the domestic country of both
the rules and the supervisory duties agreed upon at the Euro level.33 In each single country, this
agency will be the sole responsible for financial stability and correct disclosure of all financial
intermediaries - being in charge of banks, securities firms, mutual, pension and hedge funds, life
insurances - and of all securities markets
3) Establish two new different European Agencies, one responsible for the microeconomic
stability (“European Financial Supervision Authority”) and one for the transparency, investor
protection and disclosure requirements (“European Authority for Market Transparency”) of all
financial intermediaries. The two central agencies should co-ordinate the different domestic agencies
in each member country.  In this solution, we will then have two different European systems of
financial regulators,  according to the principles that suggest to replace ''institutional'' regulation by
''functional regulation'' (or by objective).
Under both 2) and 3), no antitrust power will be given to any member of the ESFS, so as to
avoid the trade-off between competition on one side and stability and transparency on the other.
Moreover, agencies responsible for supervising market competition do exist at both Euro and
domestic levels. We think that it would be wise to transform in a third separate and independent
                                                 
32 See Di Noia and Di Giorgio (1999). Another relevant issue is ''who pays for financial supervision and how much it
costs''. An attribution to the ECB of these functions could be less transparent given that they may be confused in the
monetary policy ones (thus inducing lower accountability).
33 Both the national and the central European levels of financial supervisors should exist, given the current level of
harmonization in the financial market legislation, which is far from complete, in particular with respect to taxation,
accounting rules and banking crises management.
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central agency the EU Antitrust DG. This will then coordinate and promote the harmonized activities
of domestic Antitrust agencies. In each member state, the national Antitrust agency will safeguard
competition in all economic sectors.
A special Committee (and desk) for the lending of last resort function could be established at
the ECB, with the participation (only for information and communication purposes) of members of
the (one or two) ESFS. The ESFS (or the one responsible for ''supervision'') will promote the
participation of intermediaries, in each country, to a limited insurance fund that could provide good
quality collateral to institutions facing liquidity problems in order to be able to qualify for central
bank financing. The national agency will manage the fund and assess whether an institution is just
illiquid or insolvent. In the latter case, provision of collateral should be denied.  The domestic
government could still decide whether to bail out the institution or not, being responsible and
(politically) accountable for the decision.
Our suggested 4 - peak model for financial regulation in Europe is sketched in figure 2.
Figure 2:  European System of Financial Regulation
Coordination Committee
European System of   European System of   European System for   European System
Central Banks Financial Supervisors    Market Transparency for Competition
European
Level             ECB           EFSA    EAMT          European Antitrust Agency
                                           (BIS ? Basle Committee?)       (FESCO?)
Domestic                                 Coordination Committee
Level
    Central Bank  Financial Supervision Authority       Authority for               Antitrust Authority
          Market Transparency
25
V. CONCLUSIONS.
In this paper we argued that financial market regulation should be re-designed and
harmonized in Europe according to a regulatory model by “objectives” or “finalities”.  We have first
analyzed the case of Italy and sketched a comprehensive proposal for the reform of its financial
system regulation. This would call for assigning to three distinct and independent agencies (separated
by, but coordinated with the central bank) all supervisory powers and regulatory responsibilities in
financial markets and on financial intermediaries, regardless of these being insurance companies,
banks or investment firms.  One agency should be responsible for financial microstability, another for
transparency and disclosure requirements, and the third for protection of competitive features in the
markets.
In view of the criticism addressed to the current assignment of financial regulatory and
supervisory powers in the EU, we think that the previous scheme could be extended and nested into
a wider context as the Euro area.  In particular, we are in favour of the establishment of two new
European financial regulation agencies, each formally separated by the ECB. These agencies should
be responsible for the comprehensive co-ordination of both legislation and execution of regulation in
financial markets: the first European agency should be responsible for the microeconomic stability of
all intermediaries, while the second for transparency and disclosure requirements. The third objective
of guaranteeing competition in financial (and nonfinancial) markets is already safeguarded by having
the Antitrust General Direction of the European Commission plus the domestic agencies. It would be
wise to transform in a central and independent European agency the EU Antitrust General Direction.
The latter and the two newly created central agencies will be at the centre of three European Systems
of Financial Regulators, each one structured similarly and working in connection to the ESCB,
thereby requiring active participation of national agencies in member countries. A 4 - peak regulatory
model “by objective” would be in place in the Euro Area as well as in each member country.
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